One of the biggest challenges in security is human behavior, which with one poor decision can easily bypass even the most secure encryption. This is particularly true for mobile devices, which are now part of the full range of human activity. Our project seeks to discover the conditions under which mobile users are most likely to make security errors, so that we may offer timely encouragement toward safe mobile behavior. Our earlier work indicated that any condition causing stress may increase insecure behavior, with the cause of that stress being relatively unimportant. We therefore focused on multitasking, and asked participants to choose applications to install on the phone, a particularly important security decision. Participants experienced more stress and made more security errors when multi-tasking. This suggests that when mobile users are multi-tasking, designers might create especially effective warnings and guards against error.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices pervade our lives, due to their portability and utility: they help us reach our destinations, talk to each other, buy things, and answer our questions. But this pervasiveness also makes them an important security risk: one malicious app could easily tell others where we have been, who we have spoken to, what we buy, or even record conversations. Add to this smartphone ubiquity (there are currently 2.7 billion smartphone users, and it is predicted that 80% of the world population will own smartphones by 2020 (Ericsson, 2014) ), and you have a massive security challenge.
This challenge is real and tangible. According to a recent study, 277 new malware families have been discovered in 2014 alone. Millions of U.S. mobile users were targeted by ransomware attacks, resulting in victims paying to unlock their devices and "avoid" fraudulent criminal charges (Hypponen, 2014) . How can we help users manage this risk?
Mobile devices themselves may offer a solution to this conundrum: they are equipped with a wide range of sensors that could vary guards and warnings with context, making them much more effective. Designers might create a just-in-time warning system that takes advantage of the decision making abilities of the human user, while alerting him or her that the current conditions are conducive to errors (Wogalter & Mayhorn, 2005) . Users could then make informed decisions regarding their privacy and security, taking advantage of the benefits of guards, while retaining control over the final action.
To create such a context sensitive warning system, we must first understand the context itself. This context could include environmental states, such as loud noise or rapid motion; or cognitive states, such as multi-tasking or working under stress.
Indeed, multi-tasking often causes error with mobile devices. Such multitasking might include talking with a friend or driving while using apps, or simply using two or more apps at the same time. Braverman and Meiran (2010) found that when attention is divided, individuals are less likely to respond to a task-related choice correctly, or even in the manner that they intended, and are less likely to predict the outcomes of the decisions that they make. Thus, the presence of multi-tasking warrants consideration as a predictor of performance. Our earlier work found that when multi-tasking, mobile users are not only more error-prone, but also experience more stress, and increase their reliance on more salient heuristic security cues, such as star ratings (Davis, Shashidharan, Liu, Enck, Mclaughlin, & Watson, 2014) .
Unfortunately, the heuristics and cues available to mobile phone users can be of dubious quality. Chia, Yamamoto, and Asokan (2012) found little correlation between the number of potentially insecure permissions an app requests upon install and the app's popularity, meaning that highly starred apps are not necessarily safer. Other cues available to users are app permissions and reviews. Felt, Ha, Egelman, Haney, Chin, & Wagner (2012) found that users have great difficulty understanding app permissions, and are more likely to read reviews. They inferred that even a minority of reviews could be sufficient to communicate app security adequately.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
We wished to verify that the difficulties caused by multitasking are also present in the mobile security context, and examine how these difficulties relate to the salience of security cues. Our study examined how multitasking and security cue salience affected user identification of safe smartphone apps for installation, a known entry point for malicious mobile software. Users selected apps from a custom-built store on an Android phone. We recorded the accuracy of their choice and subjective ratings of their stress.
We hypothesized that: 1) when multitasking, users would experience more stress, and have more difficulty identifying safe apps; 2) when more easily understood security cues (star ratings) were accurate, users would experience less stress and more easily identify safe apps; 3) when multitasking, users would experience less stress and more easily identify safe apps with the benefit of easily understood, accurate security cues.
METHOD Participants
Fifty-six participants (24 female, 32 male) were recruited from courses in psychology (n=39) and computer science (n=17). There were no differences in accuracy between the two samples and they were combined for analysis. They ranged in age from 19-46 (M=23.8, SD=4.1). All owned smartphones, despite no screening requirement for this attribute, and typically had owned a smartphone for 1.7 years (SD=.6 ). Participants received course credit for their time. Due to their education level and backgrounds in computer science and engineering, this sample may have been more likely to notice security issues, meaning that differences found with these participants would be expected to be exaggerated in a more general sample.
Materials
Experimental task. The app install tasks were performed on a Samsung Nexus S mobile phone with an 1 GHz Cortex-A8 CPU, 512MB RAM and 1GB storage. Participants chose apps to install from a fake app store. The store offered three apps in each of eight different categories: chat, music, bank, sport, food, map, podcast, and shopping. For each app, the store described permissions, star ratings, reviews, and number of reviews (Figures 1 & 2) . Permissions and number of reviews did not vary between apps, making the content of the reviews and the star ratings the only cues. The description screens for a safe app in the banking category (left) and the matching review screen (right). This app had low star ratings (3.5 stars) creating a security cue mismatch. Highly rated apps were given 4.5 stars.
We embedded security cues indicating which apps were malicious in their reviews. We based these on the most dangerous permissions an app can request upon install (Chia, Yamamoto, & Asokan, 2012 Apps had either high (4.5 stars) or low (3.5 stars) ratings. A cue match occurred when safe apps had high ratings, or when unsafe apps had low ratings. Otherwise there was a cue mismatch. The participant's task then was to examine information for the three apps in each category, and identify the only safe app. This involved navigating through the fake app store interface using finger taps, and pressing the "Install" button of the app the participant judged safe.
Secondary tasks.
Participants performed two secondary tasks during multi-tasking trials: one required taskswitching and the other task-sharing ( Figure 3 ). These were more extensive than the tasks used in Davis, et al. (2014) , where we found that task switching alone was relatively easy for young smartphone users. For task switching, participants had to remember to exit the fake app store every 15 seconds to answer a simple math problem in another app. They had to answer correctly to return to the app store. If they failed in this prospective memory demand or answered the math problem incorrectly, they received a time-out screen for 5 seconds, after which they could continue with the quiz. We chose the length of the time-out based on a pilot data showing participants were highly motivated to avoid time-outs that slowed their progress through the study. This secondary task is quite similar to many mobile interactions, including switching between calculator and messaging apps, or between phone and search apps.
For task sharing, users performed an auditory/verbal nback (n=1) (Monk, Jackson, Nielsen, Jefferies, & Olivier, 2011) , which required them to speak numbers they heard over headphones during the trial, at the same time that they performed task-switching and choose the safest app to install. Similar mobile interactions include maintaining conversations while using a map app, or playing a game while answering a text.
Design and Procedure
The design included two within-participant variables: Stressor presence and Cue Type. The tasks were performed under 2 stressor conditions: no stress and multi-tasking. In half the trials, the safe app was given a high star rating (Match), and half the trials the safe app was given a low star rating (Mismatch). (Review information was always reliable). Every participant experienced each of the four conditions (Stressor x Cue Type) twice for a total of 8 trials. Each trial occurred in a different app category, such as chat or shopping. The order of app categories was randomized, so that any stressor and cue type combination could occur in any app category. Order of stressor presentation and cue type were counterbalanced between participants.
The dependent measures were accuracy in choosing the only safe app from three options, and the amount of subjective stress experienced per trial as rated on a 7-point semantic differential scale from "no stress" to "extremely stressed."
When participants arrived, they were asked to read and sign a consent form. Then they observed and practiced how to use the experimental app store, but were not told which cues were important. Participants then completed the eight trials. After each trial they rated their stress level and gave the reason they chose the app as safe. Demographics were collected after the tasks were complete. The average time for the experiment was about 30 minutes.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We performed a repeated measures ANOVA on the factors of Stressor by Cue Type (2 x 2 However we found no support for our second and third hypotheses. A match or mismatch between star ratings and app safety did not significantly impact accuracy or rated stress. There was also no interaction of cue type and stressor.
Performance on the secondary n-back task sharing task (M=.37, SD=.16), recorded during multi-tasking trials, was not related to accuracy or reported stress during the trial (all ps > .05).
In sum, we found strong confirmation for our first hypothesis: multi-tasking significantly increased the stress mobile users experienced, and reduced their ability to choose safe apps. These findings confirmed trends in earlier research on the detrimental effects of stress on a task (e.g., Davis, et al., 2014) .
Somewhat surprisingly, we could not confirm our other hypotheses. Even under difficult multi-tasking conditions, we did not find that users relied more on the simpler heuristic cue offered by star ratings. A possible explanation may have been the amount of experience we allowed our participants. Across eight trials, many may have noticed that star ratings did not remain accurate (even though we did not provide correctness feedback indicating so), and focused on review content. Participant self-reports supported this potential explanation. Another possibility is that star ratings did not differ enough to be noticeable (3.5 vs 4.5 stars).
Limitations. Our experimental population was highly educated, and therefore likely to have some experience in detecting computer security threats. It is important to note, however, that this population was still not impervious to the effects of multi-tasking, when it only managed to choose a safe app around half of the time.
In conclusion, our results show that multitasking with mobile devices creates stress, and also increases insecure mobile behavior. During potentially stressful situations such as multi-tasking, system designers might take action to help users avoid such behavior.
Laughery and Wogalter's hierarchy of safety (2010) may guide such designer action. The first goal of the hierarchy is to design out hazards. Unfortunately, benevolent mobile designers are not in complete control: malicious developers are constantly working to introduce new hazards into existing systems. The second goal of the hierarchy is to guard against hazards. Guards preventing insecure action may be possible, but like most automation will fail at some point. Further, guards frustrate users when they give false alarms, preventing them from performing the completely safe actions they desire. The third goal is to warn or educate the user. For mobile devices this will be amazingly challenging, given the wide range of individuals, cultures and security risks encompassed by billions of users. Future research will have to investigate these possibilities directly in the mobile context.
